



UNIWERSYTET
EKONOMICZNY
W POZNANIU

CINSC/INFINITI 2025 • Napier University, Edinburgh • 8-10 June 2025

Exit threat and stock liquidity: Evidence from Open-Ended Pension Funds' reform in Poland

Agnieszka Stróżyńska-Szajek, Aleksander Freitag, Szymon Stereńczak



Regionalna
Inicjatywa
Doskonałości

Supported by funds granted by the Minister of Science of the Republic of Poland under the "Regional Initiative for Excellence" Programme for the implementation of the project "The Poznań University of Economics and Business for Economy 5.0: Regional Initiative – Global Effects (RIGE)".



Research problem

The endogenous nature of the relationship between stock liquidity and corporate governance

Market liquidity as integral to stock markets: A key factor shaping investor behavior and market efficiency.

High stock liquidity enables blockholders to exit if dissatisfied, increasing exit threat (Chen et al., 2020; Edmans et al., 2013).

Exit threat as disciplinary mechanism that pressures executives to align their decisions with shareholder interests (Edmans, 2009). This can enhance stock liquidity.

We aim to examine whether an increase in blockholder's exit threat improves stock liquidity



Hypotheses of the study



***H1:** An increase in the blockholder threat of exit caused by OFE reform improves stock liquidity.*



***H2:** The reform reduced stock liquidity in firms where OFEs are blockholders.*



Hypotheses of the study

***H1:** An increase in the threat of exit by OFE **improves** stock liquidity.*

***H1a:** The beneficiary effect of an increased exit threat on stock liquidity is **more pronounced** among companies with **multiple OFE blockholdings**.*



Hypotheses of the study



***H1:** An increase in the blockholder threat of exit caused by OFE reform improves stock liquidity.*



***H2:** The reform reduced stock liquidity in firms where OFEs are blockholders.*



Hypotheses of the study

***H2:** The reform reduced stock liquidity in firms where OFEs are blockholders.*

***H2a:** The adverse effect of an increased exit threat on stock liquidity is more pronounced among more informationally-opaque companies.*



Methods and data



a quasi-natural experiment from the Open-Ended Pension Funds (OFEs) reform in Poland:
difference-in-differences



2011 - 2016



318 non-financial companies
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (primary listing in the WSE)
throughout 2013 and 2014



S&P Capital IQ database



Variables definitions

<i>Stock liquidity (dependent variables)</i>	<i>ILLIQ</i>	the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio calculated as an annual average of the absolute value of daily log-return to respective trading volume (in PLN million)
	<i>Turn</i>	the turnover ratio measured as an annual sum of the unit trading volume relative to the annual average of the outstanding shares
	<i>PQCS</i>	the Percent Quoted Closing Spread computed based on the bid and ask prices quoted at the end of the day (Chung and Zhang 2014)
	<i>PECS</i>	the Percent Effective Closing Spread computed based on the mid price quoted at the end of the day and the close price
	<i>FHT</i>	the Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2017) spread estimator based on the proportion of zero-return days
	<i>Liu</i>	Liu's (2006) liquidity measure: turnover adjusted number of zero trading volume days
<i>DiD variables</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	dummy variable that equals 1 if a company has at least 1 blockholder OFE (>5%) and zero otherwise
	<i>After</i>	dummy variable that equals 1 for observations from years 2014-2016 and 0 otherwise
<i>Control variables</i>	<i>lnMV</i>	the natural logarithm of the market value of equity
	<i>Age</i>	the logarithm of the number of years since first listing
	<i>Volatility</i>	a standard deviation of weekly log returns
	<i>Leverage</i>	total debt scaled by total capital
	<i>BV/MV</i>	book-to-market ratio
	<i>Tangibility</i>	net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets



Variables definitions

	<i>ILLIQ</i>	
	<i>Turn</i>	
<i>Stock liquidity (dependent variables)</i>	<i>PQCS</i>	log-transformed due to excessive skewness and kurtosis; except <i>Turn</i> multiplied by -1 so the higher values denote higher liquidity
	<i>PECS</i>	
	<i>FHT</i>	
	<i>Liu</i>	
<i>DiD variables</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	dummy variable that equals 1 if a company has at least 1 blockholder OFE (>5%) and zero otherwise
	<i>After</i>	dummy variable that equals 1 for observations from years 2014-2016 and 0 otherwise
	<i>lnMV</i>	
	<i>Age</i>	
<i>Control variables</i>	<i>Volatility</i>	cross-sectionally winsorised at 2.5 th and 97.5 th percentiles
	<i>Leverage</i>	
	<i>BV/MV</i>	
	<i>Tangibility</i>	



Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	5 th percentile	Median	95 th percentile
<i>ILLIQ</i>	-1.009	3.308	0.588	0.236	-5.472	-1.715	5.272
<i>Turn</i>	-2.084	1.486	-0.711	1.945	-4.773	-1.980	0.106
<i>PQCS</i>	3.810	0.912	-0.632	-1.045	2.115	3.848	5.215
<i>PECS</i>	4.512	0.931	-0.609	-0.940	2.754	4.559	5.956
<i>FHT</i>	4.700	1.040	-0.232	-0.368	2.879	4.758	6.349
<i>Liu</i>	6.548	6.984	0.211	1.819	-1.518	2.428	15.535
<i>lnMV</i>	5.093	1.631	0.381	-0.114	2.607	4.935	8.358
<i>Age</i>	1.809	0.932	-1.151	1.531	0.024	1.945	2.916
<i>Volatility</i>	0.064	0.039	2.650	9.044	0.029	0.053	0.151
<i>Leverage</i>	0.266	0.214	0.779	0.234	0.000	0.244	0.704
<i>BV/MV</i>	1.133	1.082	1.207	4.002	0.082	0.880	3.443
<i>Tangibility</i>	0.287	0.228	0.516	-0.764	0.003	0.254	0.746



UNIWERSYTET
EKONOMICZNY
W POZNANIU

Empirical findings



Empirical findings

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnLLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-1.542*** (4.14)	-1.997*** (16.62)	3.564*** (36.06)	4.245*** (43.41)	-4.399*** (30.91)	6.551*** (7.36)
<i>Treatment</i>	1.388** (3.55)	0.169 (1.43)	0.535*** (4.74)	0.554*** (4.93)	0.732*** (6.06)	0.911 (1.10)
<i>After</i>	-0.318 (1.13)	-0.308** (3.77)	-0.035 (0.42)	-0.008 (0.11)	-0.060 (0.51)	-1.036 (1.27)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.381* (2.02)	-0.003 (0.17)	0.120 (1.42)	0.117 (1.43)	0.041 (0.49)	0.600 (1.15)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.057	0.013	0.106	0.108	0.129	0.010



Empirical findings

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnLLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-1.542*** (4.14)	-1.997*** (16.62)	3.564*** (36.06)	4.245*** (43.41)	-4.399*** (30.91)	6.551*** (7.36)
<i>Treatment</i>	1.388** (3.55)	0.169 (1.43)	0.535*** (4.74)	0.554*** (4.93)	0.732*** (6.06)	0.911 (1.10)
<i>After</i>	-0.318 (1.13)	-0.308** (3.77)	-0.035 (0.42)	-0.008 (0.11)	-0.060 (0.51)	-1.036 (1.27)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.381* (2.02)	-0.003 (0.17)	0.120 (1.42)	0.117 (1.43)	0.041 (0.49)	0.600 (1.15)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.057	0.013	0.106	0.108	0.129	0.010



Empirical findings cont.

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-9.583*** (17.25)	-3.545*** (12.11)	2.353*** (19.84)	3.033*** (23.94)	2.790*** (13.28)	-5.822*** (4.47)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.148 (0.53)	0.194 (1.39)	0.075 (1.33)	0.080 (1.42)	0.299*** (4.29)	-0.652 (0.95)
<i>After</i>	-0.418* (2.47)	-0.467** (3.93)	-0.061 (1.89)	-0.033 (0.89)	-0.124 (1.72)	-1.384 (1.76)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.066 (0.38)	0.056 (1.00)	0.022 (0.55)	0.014 (0.34)	-0.041 (0.98)	0.377 (0.71)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.435*** (14.37)	0.064 (1.35)	0.300*** (15.91)	0.307*** (15.91)	0.314*** (13.34)	1.782*** (10.93)
<i>Age</i>	0.449*** (4.87)	0.305** (3.91)	0.096** (3.41)	0.095** (3.40)	0.176** (3.54)	0.944** (3.91)
<i>Volatility</i>	2.609 (1.05)	7.903*** (8.26)	-6.023*** (8.02)	-6.346*** (7.79)	-2.834* (2.14)	23.278** (3.50)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.681 (1.81)	0.365 (1.49)	0.114 (1.04)	0.092 (0.82)	0.017 (0.13)	1.758 (1.80)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.333*** (4.18)	0.135* (2.25)	0.097*** (4.64)	0.095*** (4.58)	0.099*** (4.33)	0.625* (2.51)
<i>Tangibility</i>	-0.026 (0.05)	-0.094 (0.30)	-0.011 (0.09)	-0.007 (0.05)	-0.016 (0.11)	-0.537 (0.42)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.505	0.093	0.526	0.536	0.427	0.163



Empirical findings cont.

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-9.583*** (17.25)	-3.545*** (12.11)	2.353*** (19.84)	3.033*** (23.94)	2.790*** (13.28)	-5.822*** (4.47)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.148 (0.53)	0.194 (1.39)	0.075 (1.33)	0.080 (1.42)	0.299*** (4.29)	-0.652 (0.95)
<i>After</i>	-0.418* (2.47)	-0.467** (3.93)	-0.061 (1.89)	-0.033 (0.89)	-0.124 (1.72)	-1.384 (1.76)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.066 (0.38)	0.056 (1.00)	0.022 (0.55)	0.014 (0.34)	-0.041 (0.98)	0.377 (0.71)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.435*** (14.37)	0.064 (1.35)	0.300*** (15.91)	0.307*** (15.91)	0.314*** (13.34)	1.782*** (10.93)
<i>Age</i>	0.449*** (4.87)	0.305** (3.91)	0.096** (3.41)	0.095** (3.40)	0.176** (3.54)	0.944** (3.91)
<i>Volatility</i>	2.609 (1.05)	7.903*** (8.26)	-6.023*** (8.02)	-6.346*** (7.79)	-2.834* (2.14)	23.278** (3.50)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.681 (1.81)	0.365 (1.49)	0.114 (1.04)	0.092 (0.82)	0.017 (0.13)	1.758 (1.80)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.333*** (4.18)	0.135* (2.25)	0.097*** (4.64)	0.095** (4.58)	0.099*** (4.33)	0.625* (2.51)
<i>Tangibility</i>	-0.026 (0.05)	-0.094 (0.30)	-0.011 (0.09)	-0.007 (0.05)	-0.016 (0.11)	-0.537 (0.42)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.505	0.093	0.526	0.536	0.427	0.163



UNIWERSYTET
EKONOMICZNY
W POZNANIU

Alternative *Treatment* variable



Empirical findings cont.

Alternative *Treatment* variable

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-1.243** (3.93)	-1.957*** (20.42)	3.686*** (46.07)	4.370*** (54.78)	4.548*** (38.43)	6.714*** (8.97)
<i>Treatment2</i>	1.339** (3.52)	0.149 (1.45)	0.492*** (4.62)	0.511*** (4.83)	0.743*** (7.15)	1.017 (1.42)
<i>After</i>	-0.277 (1.16)	-0.332*** (4.19)	-0.020 (0.29)	0.003 (0.05)	-0.068 (0.68)	-0.930 (1.35)
<i>Treatment2*After</i>	0.513*** (4.08)	0.095*** (5.51)	0.151* (2.04)	0.157* (2.18)	0.099 (1.83)	0.657* (2.55)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.043	0.013	0.070	0.073	0.105	0.009



Empirical findings cont.

Alternative *Treatment* variable

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-1.243** (3.93)	-1.957*** (20.42)	3.686*** (46.07)	4.370*** (54.78)	4.548*** (38.43)	6.714*** (8.97)
<i>Treatment2</i>	1.339** (3.52)	0.149 (1.45)	0.492*** (4.62)	0.511*** (4.83)	0.743*** (7.15)	1.017 (1.42)
<i>After</i>	-0.277 (1.16)	-0.332*** (4.19)	-0.020 (0.29)	0.003 (0.05)	-0.068 (0.68)	-0.930 (1.35)
<i>Treatment2*After</i>	0.513*** (4.08)	0.095*** (5.51)	0.151* (2.04)	0.157* (2.18)	0.099 (1.83)	0.657* (2.55)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.043	0.013	0.070	0.073	0.105	0.009



Empirical findings cont.

Alternative *Treatment* variable

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPOCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-9.576*** (16.81)	-3.500*** (12.17)	2.376*** (19.57)	3.059*** (23.76)	2.860*** (13.96)	-5.923*** (4.76)
<i>Treatment2</i>	-0.239 (0.90)	0.150 (1.26)	0.044 (0.73)	0.050 (0.84)	0.310*** (4.78)	-0.638 (1.05)
<i>After</i>	-0.464** (3.48)	-0.478*** (4.47)	-0.074* (2.51)	-0.050 (1.51)	-0.156* (2.32)	-1.337* (2.03)
<i>Treatment2*After</i>	0.328* (2.54)	0.135*** (4.22)	0.090* (2.29)	0.093* (2.42)	0.050 (0.91)	0.546 (1.82)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.430*** (14.85)	0.067 (1.51)	0.300*** (16.33)	0.307*** (16.36)	0.314*** (13.54)	1.769*** (11.06)
<i>Age</i>	0.448*** (4.83)	0.309** (3.89)	0.097** (3.45)	0.096** (3.43)	0.179** (3.56)	0.935** (3.87)
<i>Volatility</i>	2.803 (1.12)	7.622*** (7.87)	-6.125*** (8.09)	-6.439*** (7.88)	-3.107* (2.28)	23.933** (3.54)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.686 (1.83)	0.359 (1.45)	0.112 (1.03)	0.090 (0.81)	0.010 (0.08)	1.769 (1.80)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.333*** (4.18)	0.137* (2.26)	0.098*** (4.62)	0.095*** (4.57)	0.102*** (4.45)	0.622* (2.47)
<i>Tangibility</i>	-0.031 (0.06)	-0.092 (0.30)	-0.011 (0.09)	-0.006 (0.05)	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.542 (0.42)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.505	0.093	0.526	0.536	0.429	0.163



Empirical findings cont.

Alternative *Treatment* variable

Panel B: Control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPOCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-9.576*** (16.81)	-3.500*** (12.17)	2.376*** (19.57)	3.059*** (23.76)	2.860*** (13.96)	-5.923*** (4.76)
<i>Treatment2</i>	-0.239 (0.90)	0.150 (1.26)	0.044 (0.73)	0.050 (0.84)	0.310*** (4.78)	-0.638 (1.05)
<i>After</i>	-0.464** (3.48)	-0.478*** (4.47)	-0.074* (2.51)	-0.050 (1.51)	-0.156* (2.32)	-1.337* (2.03)
<i>Treatment2*After</i>	0.328* (2.54)	0.135*** (4.22)	0.090* (2.29)	0.093* (2.42)	0.050 (0.91)	0.546 (1.82)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.430*** (14.85)	0.067 (1.51)	0.300*** (16.33)	0.307*** (16.36)	0.314*** (13.54)	1.769*** (11.06)
<i>Age</i>	0.448*** (4.83)	0.309** (3.89)	0.097** (3.45)	0.096** (3.43)	0.179** (3.56)	0.935** (3.87)
<i>Volatility</i>	2.803 (1.12)	7.622*** (7.87)	-6.125*** (8.09)	-6.439*** (7.88)	-3.107* (2.28)	23.933** (3.54)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.686 (1.83)	0.359 (1.45)	0.112 (1.03)	0.090 (0.81)	0.010 (0.08)	1.769 (1.80)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.333*** (4.18)	0.137* (2.26)	0.098*** (4.62)	0.095*** (4.57)	0.102*** (4.45)	0.622* (2.47)
<i>Tangibility</i>	-0.031 (0.06)	-0.092 (0.30)	-0.011 (0.09)	-0.006 (0.05)	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.542 (0.42)
No. of observations	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806	1,806
Adj. R ²	0.505	0.093	0.526	0.536	0.429	0.163



UNIWERSYTET
EKONOMICZNY
W POZNANIU

Propensity score matching



Propensity score matching

Panel A: Pre-match and post-match propensity

Variable	Pre-match	Post-match
<i>Const</i>	-1.125* (1.80)	0.728 (0.75)
<i>PQCS</i>	-6.137 (1.33)	-4.169 (0.46)
<i>InstOwn</i>	0.029*** (6.28)	-0.002 (0.27)
<i>InsOwn</i>	0.003 (0.71)	-0.006 (0.94)
<i>lnMV</i>	0.124* (1.85)	-0.028 (0.26)
<i>Age</i>	0.161 (1.36)	-0.151 (0.80)
<i>Volatility</i>	-9.645** (2.43)	0.949 (0.15)
<i>BV/MV</i>	-0.090* (1.83)	-0.045 (0.44)
<i>ROA</i>	0.422 (0.60)	-0.121 (0.08)
Number of observations	318	94
p-value of χ^2	0.000	0.976
Mc-Fadden R-squared	0.324	0.017



Propensity score matching

Panel B: Post-matching differences



Variable	Treatment	Control	Difference	t-Statistic
<i>ILLIQ</i>	20.395	18.025	2.369	0.283
<i>Turn</i>	0.316	0.372	-0.057	0.500
<i>PQCS</i>	0.021	0.024	-0.003	0.705
<i>PECS</i>	0.010	0.012	-0.001	0.617
<i>FHT</i>	0.012	0.012	0.001	0.295
<i>Liu</i>	0.785	0.778	0.007	0.022
<i>InstOwp</i>	29.743	30.661	-0.918	0.225
<i>SOE</i>	0.085	0.106	-0.021	0.324
<i>InsOwn</i>	18.210	22.405	-4.196	0.783
<i>MaxOwn</i>	37.914	42.946	-5.032	1.165
<i>HHI_5</i>	2113.747	2661.675	-547.929	1.490
<i>HHI_1</i>	2147.229	2687.450	-540.221	1.475
<i>lnMV</i>	5.566	5.475	0.091	0.262
<i>Age</i>	1.931	2.002	-0.071	0.415
<i>Volatility</i>	0.060	0.060	0.000	0.002
<i>Leverage</i>	0.293	0.242	0.051	0.827
<i>BV/MV</i>	1.017	1.237	-0.220	0.650
<i>ROA</i>	0.042	0.045	-0.003	0.141
<i>ROE</i>	0.055	0.114	-0.059	0.945





The distributions of OFEs in shareholders' structure

Propensity score matching

Pre-match sample



Post-match sample





Matched sample

Empirical findings cont.

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-0.270 (0.59)	-1.999*** (11.11)	4.027*** (38.67)	4.727*** (45.22)	4.989*** (49.75)	7.861*** (10.93)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.315 (0.58)	0.197 (0.91)	-0.047 (0.38)	-0.043 (0.35)	-0.008 (0.06)	-0.423 (0.43)
<i>After</i>	0.083 (1.94)	-0.012 (0.41)	0.053* (2.48)	0.075** (3.72)	-0.016 (0.43)	-0.751*** (5.32)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	-0.131 (1.15)	-0.349*** (7.56)	-0.027 (0.93)	-0.046 (1.53)	-0.060 (1.54)	0.007 (0.03)
No. of observations	540	540	540	540	540	540
Adj. R ²	-0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002



Matched sample

Empirical findings cont.

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-0.270 (0.59)	-1.999*** (11.11)	4.027*** (38.67)	4.727*** (45.22)	4.989*** (49.75)	7.861*** (10.93)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.315 (0.58)	0.197 (0.91)	-0.047 (0.38)	-0.043 (0.35)	-0.008 (0.06)	-0.423 (0.43)
<i>After</i>	0.083 (1.94)	-0.012 (0.41)	0.053* (2.48)	0.075** (3.72)	-0.016 (0.43)	-0.751*** (5.32)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	-0.131 (1.15)	-0.349*** (7.56)	-0.027 (0.93)	-0.046 (1.53)	-0.060 (1.54)	0.007 (0.03)
No. of observations	540	540	540	540	540	540
Adj. R ²	-0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002



Matched sample

Empirical findings cont.

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnLLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-10.819*** (11.26)	-4.065*** (9.30)	2.206*** (8.56)	2.896*** (10.64)	2.894*** (10.46)	-6.901** (3.25)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.415 (1.09)	0.198 (0.89)	-0.079 (0.94)	-0.074 (0.89)	-0.020 (0.22)	-0.581 (0.65)
<i>After</i>	-0.379 (1.76)	-0.099 (1.27)	-0.057 (1.85)	-0.037 (1.05)	-0.108 (1.84)	-1.416** (3.45)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.036 (0.11)	-0.279*** (3.13)	-0.006 (0.11)	-0.025 (0.42)	-0.019 (0.39)	0.334 (1.38)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.477*** (9.51)	0.098 (1.36)	0.310*** (8.83)	0.314*** (9.22)	0.311*** (8.68)	1.682*** (6.74)
<i>Age</i>	0.682** (3.41)	0.292** (2.68)	0.109* (2.19)	0.114* (2.31)	0.119* (1.97)	1.251* (2.13)
<i>Volatility</i>	19.729** (3.18)	17.381*** (5.19)	-1.749 (0.79)	-1.750 (0.72)	2.956 (1.60)	54.499** (3.60)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.906 (1.19)	0.125 (0.21)	0.313 (1.54)	0.272 (1.37)	-0.312 (1.91)	2.528 (1.06)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.119 (0.80)	0.045 (0.35)	0.036 (0.90)	0.032 (0.85)	0.112 (1.87)	0.204 (0.52)
<i>Tangibility</i>	0.456 (0.46)	-0.115 (0.24)	-0.013 (0.05)	-0.019 (0.08)	0.150 (0.49)	-0.636 (0.26)
No. of observations	540	540	540	540	540	540
Adj. R ²	0.486	0.117	0.418	0.421	0.307	0.162



Matched sample

Empirical findings cont.

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-10.819*** (11.26)	-4.065*** (9.30)	2.206*** (8.56)	2.896*** (10.64)	2.894*** (10.46)	-6.901** (3.25)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.415 (1.09)	0.198 (0.89)	-0.079 (0.94)	-0.074 (0.89)	-0.020 (0.22)	-0.581 (0.65)
<i>After</i>	-0.379 (1.76)	-0.099 (1.27)	-0.057 (1.85)	-0.037 (1.05)	-0.108 (1.84)	-1.416** (3.45)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.036 (0.11)	-0.279*** (3.13)	-0.006 (0.11)	-0.025 (0.42)	-0.019 (0.39)	0.334 (1.38)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.477*** (9.51)	0.098 (1.36)	0.310*** (8.83)	0.314*** (9.22)	0.311*** (8.68)	1.682*** (6.74)
<i>Age</i>	0.682** (3.41)	0.292** (2.68)	0.109* (2.19)	0.114* (2.31)	0.119* (1.97)	1.251* (2.13)
<i>Volatility</i>	19.729** (3.18)	17.381*** (5.19)	-1.749 (0.79)	-1.750 (0.72)	2.956 (1.60)	54.499** (3.60)
<i>Leverage</i>	0.906 (1.19)	0.125 (0.21)	0.313 (1.54)	0.272 (1.37)	-0.312 (1.91)	2.528 (1.06)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.119 (0.80)	0.045 (0.35)	0.036 (0.90)	0.032 (0.85)	0.112 (1.87)	0.204 (0.52)
<i>Tangibility</i>	0.456 (0.46)	-0.115 (0.24)	-0.013 (0.05)	-0.019 (0.08)	0.150 (0.49)	-0.636 (0.26)
No. of observations	540	540	540	540	540	540
Adj. R ²	0.486	0.117	0.418	0.421	0.307	0.162



UNIWERSYTET
EKONOMICZNY
W POZNANIU

Propensity score matching - *Treatment2*



Propensity score matching - *Treatment2*

Panel A: Pre-match and post-match propensity

Variable	Pre-match	Post-match
<i>Const</i>	-2.231*** (2.75)	0.550 (0.41)
<i>PQCS</i>	-9.234 (1.19)	-7.004 (0.53)
<i>InstOwn</i>	0.038*** (7.09)	0.000 (0.01)
<i>InsOwn</i>	0.003 (0.559)	0.003 (0.33)
<i>lnMV</i>	0.134* (1.67)	0.007 (0.05)
<i>Age</i>	0.068 (0.49)	-0.191 (0.96)
<i>Volatility</i>	-6.517 (1.23)	-0.261 (0.029)
<i>BV/MV</i>	-0.096 (1.39)	0.052 (0.53)
<i>ROA</i>	-0.664 (0.52)	-3.369 (1.15)
Number of observations	318	72
p-value of χ^2	0.000	0.943
Mc-Fadden R-squared	0.364	0.029



Propensity score matching - *Treatment2*

Panel B: Post-matching differences



Variable	Treatment	Control	Difference	t-Statistic
<i>ILLIQ</i>	13.217	13.433	-0.217	0.036
<i>Turn</i>	0.186	0.376	-0.190	1.659
<i>PQCS</i>	0.020	0.021	-0.000	0.083
<i>PECS</i>	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.187
<i>FHT</i>	0.008	0.010	-0.001	1.011
<i>Liu</i>	0.715	0.563	0.152	0.547
<i>InstOwp</i>	41.447	40.442	1.005	0.237
<i>SOE</i>	0.056	0.056	0.000	0.000
<i>InsOwn</i>	17.701	18.267	-0.566	0.132
<i>MaxOwn</i>	34.502	40.173	-5.671	1.358
<i>HHI_5</i>	1893.705	2418.034	-524.329	1.475
<i>HHI_1</i>	1928.417	2454.532	-526.115	1.491
<i>lnMV</i>	5.720	5.750	-0.030	0.090
<i>Age</i>	1.969	2.070	-0.101	0.566
<i>Volatility</i>	0.055	0.054	0.001	0.163
<i>Leverage</i>	0.238	0.236	0.002	0.036
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.936	0.545	0.391	0.669
<i>ROA</i>	0.034	0.053	-0.019	1.209
<i>ROE</i>	0.056	0.085	-0.029	0.589





Propensity score matching

The distributions of OFEs in shareholders' structure

Pre-match sample



Post-match sample





Matched sample and *Treatment2*

Empirical findings cont.

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>lnLLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-0.095 (0.20)	-1.872*** (11.10)	4.097*** (35.37)	4.795*** (41.61)	5.170*** (43.85)	7.531*** (7.34)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.587 (0.95)	-0.104 (0.54)	-0.089 (0.63)	-0.083 (0.60)	-0.017 (0.12)	-1.420 (1.26)
<i>After</i>	-0.338*** (3.99)	-0.390*** (8.10)	-0.028 (1.62)	0.003 (0.21)	-0.228*** (6.05)	-1.420*** (4.22)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.374** (2.98)	0.244*** (4.72)	0.152*** (6.59)	0.146*** (5.97)	0.192*** (6.51)	1.009** (3.51)
No. of observations	413	413	413	413	413	413
Adj. R ²	-0.002	0.009	-0.003	-0.002	0.007	0.003



Matched sample and *Treatment2*

Empirical findings cont.

Panel A: No control variables

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnLLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-0.095 (0.20)	-1.872*** (11.10)	4.097*** (35.37)	4.795*** (41.61)	5.170*** (43.85)	7.531*** (7.34)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.587 (0.95)	-0.104 (0.54)	-0.089 (0.63)	-0.083 (0.60)	-0.017 (0.12)	-1.420 (1.26)
<i>After</i>	-0.338*** (3.99)	-0.390*** (8.10)	-0.028 (1.62)	0.003 (0.21)	-0.228*** (6.05)	-1.420*** (4.22)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.374** (2.98)	0.244*** (4.72)	0.152*** (6.59)	0.146*** (5.97)	0.192*** (6.51)	1.009** (3.51)
No. of observations	413	413	413	413	413	413
Adj. R ²	-0.002	0.009	-0.003	-0.002	0.007	0.003



Empirical findings cont.

Matched sample and *Treatment2*

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>lnLLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-11.546*** (10.91)	-4.078*** (6.92)	2.039*** (6.73)	2.741*** (10.27)	2.727*** (10.14)	-8.247** (3.46)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.723* (2.55)	-0.082 (0.47)	-0.124 (1.67)	-0.116 (1.59)	-0.009 (0.09)	-1.619 (1.91)
<i>After</i>	-0.518** (3.22)	-0.418*** (5.41)	-0.081** (2.65)	-0.054 (1.34)	-0.295*** (4.89)	-1.495** (2.90)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.372 (1.56)	0.240** (2.78)	0.130*** (4.15)	0.122** (3.25)	0.185** (3.08)	1.037 (1.23)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.702*** (9.64)	0.181* (2.31)	0.330*** (8.02)	0.332*** (8.65)	0.311*** (8.29)	2.281*** (7.30)
<i>Age</i>	0.392* (2.56)	0.176 (1.80)	0.077 (1.94)	0.088* (2.30)	0.204** (2.67)	0.257 (0.59)
<i>Volatility</i>	10.316 (1.78)	12.542* (2.37)	-3.629 (1.31)	-3.964 (1.53)	4.722* (1.96)	34.577* (2.25)
<i>Leverage</i>	2.091* (2.28)	0.811 (1.65)	0.747** (3.17)	0.707** (3.14)	0.204 (0.84)	4.925* (2.36)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.392* (2.02)	0.068 (0.51)	0.092* (2.37)	0.090* (2.26)	0.082 (1.46)	0.499 (0.91)
<i>Tangibility</i>	-0.242 (0.28)	-0.166 (0.40)	0.123 (0.66)	0.100 (0.53)	-0.117 (0.41)	-2.653 (1.28)
No. of observations	413	413	413	413	413	413
Adj. R ²	0.583	0.131	0.520	0.533	0.408	0.241



Matched sample and *Treatment2*

Empirical
findings
cont.

Panel B: Control variables						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	<i>lnILLIQ</i>	<i>lnTurn</i>	<i>lnPQCS</i>	<i>lnPECS</i>	<i>lnFHT</i>	<i>lnLiu</i>
<i>const</i>	-11.546*** (10.91)	-4.078*** (6.92)	2.039*** (6.73)	2.741*** (10.27)	2.727*** (10.14)	-8.247** (3.46)
<i>Treatment</i>	-0.723* (2.55)	-0.082 (0.47)	-0.124 (1.67)	-0.116 (1.59)	-0.009 (0.09)	-1.619 (1.91)
<i>After</i>	-0.518** (3.22)	-0.418*** (5.41)	-0.081** (2.65)	-0.054 (1.34)	-0.295*** (4.89)	-1.495** (2.90)
<i>Treatment*After</i>	0.372 (1.56)	0.240** (2.78)	0.130*** (4.15)	0.122** (3.25)	0.185** (3.08)	1.037 (1.23)
<i>lnMV</i>	1.702*** (9.64)	0.181* (2.31)	0.330*** (8.02)	0.332*** (8.65)	0.311*** (8.29)	2.281*** (7.30)
<i>Age</i>	0.392* (2.56)	0.176 (1.80)	0.077 (1.94)	0.088* (2.30)	0.204** (2.67)	0.257 (0.59)
<i>Volatility</i>	10.316 (1.78)	12.542* (2.37)	-3.629 (1.31)	-3.964 (1.53)	4.722* (1.96)	34.577* (2.25)
<i>Leverage</i>	2.091* (2.28)	0.811 (1.65)	0.747** (3.17)	0.707** (3.14)	0.204 (0.84)	4.925* (2.36)
<i>BV/MV</i>	0.392* (2.02)	0.068 (0.51)	0.092* (2.37)	0.090* (2.26)	0.082 (1.46)	0.499 (0.91)
<i>Tangibility</i>	-0.242 (0.28)	-0.166 (0.40)	0.123 (0.66)	0.100 (0.53)	-0.117 (0.41)	-2.653 (1.28)
No. of observations	413	413	413	413	413	413
Adj. R ²	0.583	0.131	0.520	0.533	0.408	0.241



Main conclusions

What we found:

- **No liquidity effect** for firms with a **single OFE blockholder** – the reform had no consistent impact on this group.
- **Liquidity improved** in firms with **multiple OFE blockholders**, likely due to a stronger and more credible exit threat.

What it means:

- There is **no uniform liquidity effect** of institutional ownership.
- **The intensity** of institutional engagement matters.
- Liquidity improvements are **more likely** when exit threat is **credible and stronger**.



Future research agenda

What's next:

- Heterogeneity of the effect of the increased exit threat on stock liquidity - firms with different levels of agency problems and information asymmetry.
- Parallel trends assumption.
- Heckman self-selection model (?).
- ?



UNIWERSYTET
EKONOMICZNY
W POZNANIU

Thank you for your attention!